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Introduction
In mid-2005 the British government commissioned 
its chief economic adviser, Sir Nicholas Stern, 
to review the economics of climate change. His 
report, released in late October 2006, is detailed, 
comprehensive and sobering. Not surprisingly, given 
the many controversies surrounding the causes and 
likely consequences of climate change, the report has 
sparked vigorous debate. Predictably, various critics 
have questioned key elements of the scientifi c evidence 
upon which the Stern Review is based (see Carter, et 
al., 2006; Lawson, 2006). Others have challenged 
some of the main assumptions underpinning the 
Review’s economic analysis, such as the use of a very 
low discount rate, the focus on total costs and benefi ts 
rather than marginal costs and benefi ts, and the claimed 
tendency to rely on the most pessimistic studies and 
estimates of the damage that global warming may 
cause (see Lomborg, 2006; Nordhaus, 2006; Tol, 
2006).1 For such reasons, it is argued that the Review 
is likely to have overestimated the environmental, 
social and economic impacts of climate change, and 
thus exaggerated the expected benefi ts of measures to 
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
Against this, others maintain that the Review 
underestimates the potential costs and risks of climate 
change, including the scope and scale of damages 
likely to be caused at different temperatures and the 
risks of abrupt climate change (see Stern, 2006b, p.2, 
and the Technical Annex, p.4). A related concern is 
that the Review endorses a stabilisation target for 
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere that, given 
the cost-benefi t estimates reported, is insuffi ciently 
stringent (Baer, 2007; Tol and Yohe, 2006), and 
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arguably incompatible with the requirements of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Under article 2 of this 
Convention, the parties agreed to ensure that GHG 
concentrations would be stabilised at a level that 
prevents ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system’. Stabilisation targets of the kind 
proposed by Stern, it is argued, are likely to result in 
an increase in the global mean surface temperature, at 
equilibrium, of around 3ºC (i.e. above pre-industrial 
levels). This is well above the cap of 2ºC of warming 
which has been endorsed by many scientists and 
the European Union (EU) as being the maximum 
compatible with the provisions of the UNFCCC. 
Indeed, Stern readily accepts that the upper end of 
the Review’s proposed stabilisation target range is a 
‘risky place to be’ (2006b, p.3).
The purpose of this brief article is to consider some of 
the key issues surrounding stabilisation targets. These 
include the relationship between GHG concentrations 
in the atmosphere and changes in global mean surface 
temperatures, the necessary conditions for achieving a 
stabilisation of GHG concentrations, the magnitude 
of the GHG emission reductions required to meet 
particular stabilisation targets, and the reasoning behind 
the targets proposed by the Stern Review. It must be 
emphasised that the issues surrounding stabilisation 
targets are complex and it is only possible to provide 
a broad summary of the relevant considerations in 
this article. Furthermore, there are many remaining 
uncertainties, knowledge gaps and areas of continuing 
debate, particularly in relation to climate sensitivity, 
the operation of various feedback mechanisms and the 
degree of inertia in the climate system. For such reasons, 
there is a need for caution and humility in addressing 
the question of what stabilisation target(s) might be 
appropriate. 
  1 The issues surrounding the discount rate used by Stern are 
explored by Dennis Rose in a separate article in this issue of Policy 
Quarterly.
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Stabilisation levels and temperature 
increases
In 2006 the concentration of CO
2
 in the atmosphere 
reached 380 parts per million (ppm), or around 35% 
above pre-industrial levels. During the past decade, 
concentrations have been rising at close to 2 ppm per 
annum, and the rate of increase has accelerated somewhat 
since the 1960s and 1970s. Taking the six Kyoto GHGs 
into account (CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, SF
6
, HFCs and PFCs), 
the Stern Review (2006a, p.193) estimates that the 
concentration of GHGs is presently around 430 ppm 
CO
2
 equivalent (CO
2
e). This is close to 50% higher than 
pre-industrial levels. On a plausible business-as-usual 
scenario, it is estimated that CO
2
e concentations will 
reach 550 ppm by 2035, and much higher levels later 
in the century (Stern, 2006a, p.177).2
Uncertainty remains over the sensitivity of the climate to 
increasing concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
(The climate sensitivity is defi ned as the increase in the 
global mean surface temperature, at equilibrium, as a 
result of a sustained doubling of CO
2
 concentrations.) 
Hence, as the Stern Review (2006a, p.194) readily 
acknowledges, ‘The relationship between stabilisation 
levels and temperature rise is not known precisely’. 
Nevertheless, for over two decades there has been a broad 
consensus that the climate sensitivity is very likely to fall 
between 1.5ºC and 4.5ºC, with only a small chance (e.g. 
around 5–10%) of a rise of a lesser or greater amount.3 
The consensus view is based on evidence from a range 
of sources, including simulations using global climate 
models, analysis of the impact of specifi c events (such 
as the eruption of Mt Pinatubo in 1991) on global 
temperatures, assessment of paleo-climate data, and 
analyses based on observed temperature changes since 
the mid-19th century. Thus far, most of the analyses 
have yielded a skewed climate sensitivity probability 
distribution – with a longer tail on the higher end of 
the temperature spectrum. 
Some very recent analyses have pointed to the climate 
sensitivity being slightly higher than estimated in the 
1990s. Such results refl ect, in part, the placing of rather 
greater weight on the impact of various amplifying 
feedbacks, such as the release of methane from melting 
permafrost in the Arctic and the weakening of major 
carbon sinks (e.g. the Amazon rainforest) (see Steffen, 
2006). Nevertheless, most estimates suggest that a 
sustained doubling of CO
2
 concentrations from pre-
industrial levels (to around 550 ppm) can be expected 
(other things being equal) to generate an increase in the 
global mean surface temperature of approximately 3ºC 
at equilibrium. Note that equilibrium levels will not be 
achieved for well over a century. 
But what magnitude of temperature increase might be 
expected if CO
2 
concentrations are stabilised at levels 
lower (or higher) than 550 ppm, and what are the risks of 
an increase of more than 3ºC if concentrations double? 
Table 1, which is drawn from the Stern Review, outlines 
an indicative range of likelihoods of exceeding a certain 
increase in temperature, at equilibrium, for a series of 
stabilisation levels measured in CO
2
e. The ‘maximum’ 
and ‘minimum’ columns show the maximum and 
minimum chance of exceeding a particular temperature 
increase, based on 11 recent studies (see Meinshausen, 
2006). The results reported for the ‘Hadley Centre’ in 
Table 1 are based on Murphy et al. (2004), while the 
results of the ‘IPCC TAR 2001’ (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report) 
are based on Wigley and Raper (2001). Note that the 
individual values are approximate only. 
The data presented in Table 1 highlight a number of 
signifi cant points. First, the Hadley Centre’s results 
refl ect the incorporation of slightly higher climate 
sensitivity estimates than those used by the IPCC in 
2001. It is notable that only a modest increase in such 
estimates generates a relative large rise in the probability 
of exceeding particular temperature thresholds. Second, 
it is interesting to consider the implications if CO
2
e 
concentrations were to be stabilised at 450 ppm – which 
is only about 20 ppm above current levels. Based on the 
results in the ‘minimum’ column, there is at least a 26% 
chance of the global mean surface temperature rising 
by more than 2ºC, and a 4% chance of it exceeding 
3ºC. At the other extreme (i.e. using the results in the 
‘maximum’ column), there is a 78% chance of exceeding 
2ºC, a 50% chance of exceeding 3ºC and even a 21% 
2 Carter et al. (2006, p.197) dispute the proposition that CO
2
e 
concentrations in the atmosphere will increase by as much as 120 
ppm by 2035, but given various assumptions (e.g. continued global 
economic growth, limited action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
etc.) there can be little doubt that concentrations will continue to 
increase and are likely to do so at an accelerating rate.
  3 According to the recently published ‘Summary for Policymakers’ of 
the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, climate sensitivity ‘is likely to 
be in the range of 2 to 4.5ºC with a best estimate of about 3ºC’ (2007, 
p.12). 
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chance of a huge 5ºC temperature increase. Third, if 
CO
2
e concentrations exceed 550 ppm for an extended 
period, there is only a small chance (37% on the most 
optimistic estimate and 1% using the Hadley results) 
of staying within the European Union’s proposed 2ºC 
cap, and around a 30–70% chance of exceeding 3ºC. 
Finally, even stabilising CO
2
e concentrations at 400 
ppm generates a signifi cant risk (13% for the IPCC 
TAR and 33% for Hadley) of a temperature increase 
of more than 2ºC, and there is even a small risk of 
exceeding 4ºC. Put differently, as Meinshausen (2006, 
p.264) has observed, ‘Only at levels around 400ppm 
CO
2
 equivalent or below, could the probability of 
staying below 2ºC in equilibrium be termed “likely” 
for most of the climate sensitivity PDFs [probability 
density functions]’.
Stabilisation level 
(CO
2
e)
Maximum Hadley Centre 
Ensemble
IPCC TAR 2001* 
Ensemble
Minimum
Probability of exceeding 2˚C (relative to pre-industrial levels)
400 57% 33% 13% 8%
450 78% 78% 38% 26%
500 96% 96% 61% 48%
550 99% 99% 77% 63%
650 100% 100% 92% 82%
750 100% 100% 97% 90%
Probability of exceeding 3˚C (relative to pre-industrial levels)
400 34% 3% 1% 1%
450 50% 18% 6% 4%
500 61% 44% 18% 11%
550 69% 69% 32% 21%
650 94% 94% 57% 44%
750 99% 99% 74% 60%
Probability of exceeding 4˚C (relative to pre-industrial levels)
400 17% 1% 0% 0%
450 34% 3% 1% 0%
500 45% 11% 4% 2%
550 53% 24% 9% 6%
650 66% 58% 25% 16%
750 82% 82% 41% 29%
Probability of exceeding 5˚C (relative to pre-industrial levels)
400 3% 0% 0% 0%
450 21% 1% 0% 0%
500 32% 3% 1% 0%
550 41% 7% 2% 1%
650 53% 24% 9% 5%
750 62% 47% 19% 11%
* Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Third Assessment Report, 2001.
Source: Stern Review, 2006a, p.195.
Table 1: Likelihood of exceeding a temperature increase at equilibrium
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How concerning are such results? If the probability 
ranges reported in Table 1 are broadly correct (and this, 
admittedly, remains open to some debate), the results 
present a stark warning. After all, an increase in the global 
mean surface temperature of 2º–3ºC will have very 
signifi cant, and largely negative, environmental, social 
and economic impacts across the globe. As summarised 
in the Stern Review and elsewhere (Chapman et al., 
2006; Schellnhuber et al., 2006), such impacts include 
an increase in the sea level of many metres, more severe 
droughts, fl oods and storms, the loss of most coral reefs 
and mountain glaciers, and the extinction of a signifi cant 
proportion of terrestrial species. Such changes will 
generate major water shortages in many regions, reduce 
food production, inundate many coastal settlements 
and river deltas, and cause huge economic losses. Quite 
apart from this, sustained high concentrations of GHGs 
in the atmosphere are likely to have major adverse 
impacts on oceanic chemistry and marine ecosystems 
(Turley, 2006).
Achieving stabilisation
In order to stabilise CO
2
e concentrations, it will be 
necessary for global GHG emissions to equal the natural 
uptake of carbon from the atmosphere. As the Stern 
Review (2006a, p.194) points out:
The longer global emissions remain above this 
level, the higher the stabilisation level will be. 
It is the cumulative emissions of greenhouse 
gases, less their cumulative removal from the 
atmosphere, for example by chemical processes 
or through absorption by the Earth’s natural 
systems, that defines their concentration at 
stabilisation. 
Bear in mind that the natural rate of uptake is at 
least partly influenced by human actions, such as 
deforestation, afforestation and other land-use changes. 
Globally, signifi cant deforestation is occurring, thus 
reducing the natural uptake of carbon. Achieving 
stabilisation, therefore, will require action not only 
to reduce GHG emissions but also to increase carbon 
sequestration into the biosphere via land-use changes 
(such as afforestation and reforestation). In developing 
a global mitigation strategy, the question of the 
appropriate balance between emission reductions and 
land-use changes is one of many issues that deserve 
further attention (see Read, 2006). 
On the basis of the estimated current natural uptake 
of carbon, achieving stabilisation – at whatever the 
agreed concentration of CO
2
e – will require emission 
reductions of at least 80% from 2005 levels (Stern, 
2006a, p.199). What this means for individual countries 
will depend on a range of technical, ethical and political 
considerations. In all likelihood, richer countries with 
high per capita emissions will be expected to reduce their 
emissions by more than the average. This could well 
entail net emission cuts of over 90% from current levels 
(with the precise reduction in gross emissions dependent 
upon the potential for securing offsets). 
Other things being equal, the timeframe within which 
stabilisation occurs, and the eventual stabilisation level 
that is secured, will depend on how rapidly emissions 
can be cut. Realistically, of course, any global effort to 
stabilise CO
2
e concentrations is likely to take much of 
this century to achieve. Leaving aside the cumbersome 
and time-consuming nature of global negotiations 
over climate-change policy, there is substantial inertia 
in the global economy, with the result that it will take 
considerable time and effort to move towards a low-
emissions pathway. This is due to lengthy infrastructure 
investment processes and long replacement cycles for 
most capital stock, as well as the sheer magnitude of the 
task of decarbonising complex and expensive energy and 
transportation systems (e.g. replacing carbon-intensive 
capital stock with low-carbon technologies). Equally, the 
Earth’s climate system is characterised by considerable 
lags. Hence, even if GHG emissions are stabilised and 
then reduced rapidly over the next few decades (which 
will be a signifi cant challenge), CO
2
e concentrations will 
take many decades to stabilise, the global mean surface 
temperature will continue to rise for a much longer 
period, and the sea level is likely to continue rising for 
several thousand years. 
Importantly, too, there is some uncertainty over the 
likely natural uptake of carbon during the coming 
century, and in particular over whether changes in the 
climate will increase or reduce the natural absorption 
rate. At this juncture, the available evidence suggests 
that there is a signifi cant risk that the absorption of 
CO
2
 by the Earth’s soils, vegetation and oceans will slow 
as the mean temperature increases. If this is the case, 
then even greater reductions in cumulative emissions 
(and/or expansion of carbon sinks) will be required to 
achieve any particular stabilisation target. Furthermore, 
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after stabilisation has been achieved it is expected that 
the level of natural absorption will fall, partly because 
of the gradual exhaustion of the vegetation sink and 
partly because of a weakening of the rate of ocean 
uptake (Stern, 2006a, p.197). Given this situation, 
GHG emissions will need to keep falling long after 
stabilisation has been achieved. Indeed, according 
to the Stern Review, it may be necessary in the long 
run to reduce annual emissions to less than 1GtCO
2
e 
(gigatonnes of CO
2
e) in order to maintain a particular 
stabilisation level. This would mean cutting emissions 
to about 2% of current levels – which are close to 
45GtCO
2
e per annum. 
As the Stern Review observes, there is a distinction 
between ‘stabilisation’ and ‘peaking’. Conceptually, it 
might be possible for CO
2
e concentrations to peak at, 
say, 470 ppm and then fall gradually, via an effective 
mitigation strategy, to an intended stabilisation level of, 
say, 450 ppm. This, however, would require reducing 
annual emissions below the natural absorption rate for 
a signifi cant period of time or, alternatively, raising the 
natural absorption rate ‘artifi cially’ for a period through 
extensive afforestation and reforestation. But such 
approaches may be very hard to implement, for technical 
and/or political reasons. Moreover, as highlighted 
by Meinshausen (2006), the level of the peak, the 
magnitude of the ‘overshooting’, and the length of time 
near the peak are likely to be important – and there is 
always the risk that the natural rate of carbon absorption 
may weaken under the impact of higher temperatures 
and related feedback processes, thus making it all the 
more diffi cult to reach the intended stabilisation target. 
For such reasons, the Stern Review cautions against 
placing too much reliance upon the idea of overshooting 
as part of a global mitigation strategy.  
Setting stabilisation targets
Stern recommends a stabilisation target of between 
450 and 550 ppm CO
2
e. This is in line with the 
recommendations of various scientists, such as Barrie 
Pittock (2006, p.292). The logic for this particular target 
range is summarised in the Review as follows: 
stabilisation at levels below 450 ppm CO
2
e 
would require immediate, substantial and 
rapid cuts in emissions that are likely to be 
extremely costly, whereas stabilisation above 550 
ppm CO
2
e would imply climatic risks that are 
very large and likely to be generally viewed as 
unacceptable.
There can be little doubt, given the sobering evidence 
presented by Stern, that a stabilisation target above 550 
ppm CO
2
e would be unacceptably high – on a range of 
ethical, environmental and economic criteria. A target 
of 650 ppm, for instance, would almost certainly result 
in a mean temperature increase of more than 2ºC and 
would have a relatively high chance of generating an 
increase of more than 3ºC. But is not a target range 
of 500–550 ppm CO
2
e also unacceptable? After all, 
on the Hadley Centre’s estimates, stabilisation at 500 
ppm yields a 96% chance of exceeding 2ºC and a 44% 
chance of exceeding 3ºC. By almost any standards 
these are high risks. And, as previously noted, a mean 
temperature increase of these magnitudes will have 
serious and pervasive impacts on ecosystems, physical 
infrastructure, food production, geopolitical stability 
and human well-being – and many of the impacts will 
be irreversible. 
Yet, as the Stern Review highlights, achieving a 
stabilisation level of 500 ppm CO
2
e, let alone a lower 
figure, will be a formidable undertaking. Table 2 
illustrates the emission paths required to reach three 
different stabilisation targets: 450 ppm, 500 ppm and 
550 ppm CO
2
e. As shown in the Table, to have any 
realistic chance of stabilising at 450 ppm CO
2
e, global 
GHG emissions must peak no later than around 2010 
and then fall at a rate of about 7% per annum, with 
an overall cut in emissions of about 70% below 2005 
levels by 2050. According to Stern (2006a, p.193), such 
rapid, sustained cuts may be unachievable given existing 
and readily foreseeable technologies (and assuming 
continuing global economic growth). Stabilising at 500 
ppm CO
2
e is somewhat less taxing, but nevertheless 
emissions will need to peak no later than around 2020 
(to avoid overshooting), and then fall at around 4–6% 
per annum, with a decrease of 60–70% by 2050. Such 
rates of reduction are outside the parameters of what 
has been achieved thus far in individual states (let alone 
at the global level), except during periods of serious 
political and economic upheaval. Even to achieve a 
stabilisation target of 550 ppm CO
2
e will be challenging. 
As Stern (2006a, p.205) notes, this is likely to require 
cutting current global average emissions per capita by 
50% by 2050, and an even larger reduction in emissions 
per unit of GDP. 
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The results presented in Table 2 also highlight the 
importance of early policy action: the longer that 
effective measures to curb emissions are delayed, the 
more substantial the reductions will need to be to meet 
a particular target. For instance, a delay of even ten years 
in the date at which emissions peak is likely to mean 
that emissions will have to fall at a 50–100% faster 
rate to achieve the agreed target. Moreover, delayed 
action increases the risks of severe climate impacts and 
accentuates the potential for triggering abrupt changes 
in the climate system.
Policy action to stabilise and then reduce emissions in 
a sustained manner will impose costs – although the 
magnitude of these should not be exaggerated. Using 
various methodologies, Stern (2006a, p.xiv) estimates 
that stabilising CO
2
e concentrations at 500–550 ppm 
will cost about 1% of annual global GDP by 2050 
(with a range of between –5% and +1% of GDP). In 
other words, global GDP will be about 1% lower mid-
century than it would have been had there been no 
mitigation strategy in place. Assuming a global GDP 
of about US$100 trillion in 2050, the cost would be 
about US$1 trillion – not a trivial sum, but less than 
twice what the US currently spends each year on defence 
(including the ‘Global War on Terror’). Beyond 2050 
the costs of mitigation are much less certain; but they 
may well increase if – as might be expected – it becomes 
necessary to make greater use of the more expensive 
low-carbon technologies that are available. Overall, 
Stern’s calculations are consistent with much of the 
recent literature on the costs of decarbonising the global 
economy (see Hatfi eld-Dodds, 2006; Metz and van 
Vuuren, 2006), and are therefore likely to concur with 
the conclusions of the forthcoming Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC (Stern, 2006b, p.3).
To date, relatively few studies have examined the 
technical feasibility and likely costs of achieving a CO
2
e 
stabilisation target at the lower end of Stern’s proposed 
range (i.e. 450 ppm). Such analyses suggest, however, 
that the costs will be greater than those associated with 
the pursuit of a target of 550 ppm – perhaps as much 
as three times higher (Stern, 2006a, p.247). One reason 
for this is that a lower target will necessitate very sharp 
reductions in emissions within the next few decades, 
thus entailing the premature retirement of carbon-
intensive capital stock, retrofi tting cleaner technologies 
Stabilisation level 
CO
2
e
Date of global 
peak emissions
Global emissions 
reduction rate 
(% per year)
Percentage reduction in emissions 
below 
2005 valuesa
2050 2100
 450ppm 2010 7.0 70 75
500ppm
(falling to 450ppm 
in 2150)
2020 - - -
2010 3.0 50 75
2020 4.0 – 6.0 60 – 70 75
2030 5.0b – 5.5c 50 – 60 75 – 80
550ppm
2040 - - -
2015 1.0 25 50
2020 1.5 – 2.5 25 – 30 50 – 55
2030 2.5 – 4.0 25 – 30 50 – 55
2040 3.0 – 4.5d 5 – 15 50 – 60
Table 2: Illustrative emission paths to stabilisation
Notes: a. 2005 emissions taken as 45 GtCO
2
e/yr; b. overshoot to 520ppm; c. overshoot to 550ppm; d. overshoot 
to 600ppm. The symbol ‘-’ indicates that stabilisation is not possible given the relevant assumption.
Source: Stern (2006a), p.200.
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(which tends to be a more expensive option than starting 
from scratch), and the adoption of relatively costly low-
carbon technologies. 
Are such additional costs justifi able? This is a diffi cult 
question to answer. As Stern and his critics have repeatedly 
argued, there are large uncertainties surrounding the 
economics of climate change. What particular course of 
action is best, as judged in cost-benefi t terms, depends on 
a large number of assumptions and estimates, all of which 
are open to question. Hence, in attempting to assess the 
likely marginal costs and benefi ts associated with different 
stabilisation targets one is faced with a huge potential 
margin of error. Having said this, the available evidence 
strongly suggests that the higher the stabilisation level, the 
greater the likely costs to the planet, and hence the greater 
the risks to human civilisation. Moreover, such costs can 
be expected to increase in a somewhat unpredictable and 
non-linear fashion, and many of the impacts are very 
likely to be serious and irreversible. A further relevant 
consideration is that there are bound to be signifi cant co-
benefi ts (many of which are diffi cult to quantify and place 
a dollar value on) associated with policy action to reduce 
emissions and improve land management practices. Such 
co-benefi ts include enhanced fl ood protection, improved 
water quality, greater energy effi ciency, new technological 
breakthroughs, lower pollution levels, better health 
outcomes and an improved quality of life. 
Additionally, adequate attention needs to be given to 
the precautionary principle. Under article 3.3 of the 
UNFCCC, the global community has agreed to
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent 
or minimize the causes of climate change and 
mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientifi c certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing such measures, taking into account 
that policies and measures to deal with climate 
change should be cost-effective so as to ensure 
global benefi ts at the lowest possible cost.
Given the nature and magnitude of the risks if the 
global mean surface temperature rises by 2ºC or more, 
there is surely a case, on precautionary grounds, for 
pursuing a stabilisation target as low as possible, even 
if this entails signifi cant up-front costs (see Baer, 2007). 
There is equally a case for a substantial additional public 
investment in research and development with the aim 
of generating technologies that enable the pace of 
decarbonisation to be accelerated – thus making even 
lower targets technically feasible. 
Implications for New Zealand
The New Zealand government has thus far refrained 
from endorsing any specifi c, long-term climate change 
target, whether in the form of a temperature cap (like the 
EU) or a CO
2
e stabilisation level. Nor has it committed 
itself to a particular long-term target with regard to 
GHG emission reductions, let alone specifi c milestones 
for achieving this target. Elsewhere, a growing number 
of countries and states/provinces within federal systems 
are making commitments of various kinds. For instance, 
Britain is not only a signatory to the EU temperature 
cap but has also set itself a target of reducing emissions 
by 60% below 1990 levels by 2050, while California is 
pursuing an even more ambitious target of 80% cuts by 
2050. Within the EU, the environment commissioner, 
Stavros Dimas, has proposed a 30% cut in emissions by 
2020, but this has yet to be agreed by member states. 
Importantly, the prime minister, Helen Clark, spoke in 
late 2006 of the desirability of moving towards carbon 
neutrality (i.e. zero net emissions) as a long-term, 
national objective. Thus far, however, the government 
has been reluctant to associate itself with specific, 
medium-term targets, whether at an aggregate or sectoral 
level. Perhaps the only exception is the suggestion that 
the agricultural sector should consider the possibility 
of reducing methane and nitrous oxide emissions by at 
least 20% by 2012 (as compared with the business-as-
usual emission levels) (see Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 2006, p.24).
In considering the question of what targets New 
Zealand should endorse (in terms of both the nature of 
the targets and the timeframe for their achievement), 
it needs to be borne in mind that on a per capita basis 
this country’s GHG emissions are relatively high 
(around 12th in the world). On equity grounds, it can 
be argued that countries with high per capita emissions 
should be obliged to make a disproportionately large 
contribution to the global effort to reduce emissions. 
Against this, almost 50% of New Zealand’s emissions 
are from the agricultural sector (mostly in the form 
of methane from ruminant animals), and there is 
currently no technological solution available for 
reducing the bulk of these emissions (except via cuts in 
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livestock numbers). Accordingly, it might be reasonable 
for New Zealand to argue that it cannot be expected 
to cut its agricultural emissions to the extent or at the 
speed of the reductions possible in the energy and 
transport sectors. 
Nevertheless, there is a good case, based on the available 
scientifi c evidence, for New Zealand endorsing the EU 
temperature cap. If it did so, it would need to consider 
the implications in terms of a CO
2
e stabilisation target 
and a related emissions pathway (both globally and 
nationally). In my view, New Zealand should seek 
international agreement on a CO
2
e stabilisation target 
at the bottom end of the range suggested by the Stern 
Review (if not lower – at least as an ideal). On the 
issue of an emissions pathway, New Zealand should 
set itself appropriately high reduction targets for the 
energy and transport sectors, probably in the vicinity 
of 80–90% by 2050, with appropriate milestones over 
the next four decades. On the issue of agricultural 
emissions, the government should commit signifi cant 
additional funds to the challenge of reducing methane 
production by ruminants, as well as pursuing policies to 
reduce the rate of deforestation and encourage carbon 
farming. Above all, the government should take the 
lead in encouraging public discussion about the kind 
of long-term domestic targets (and related milestones) 
to which the country should commit itself, as well as 
the global targets on which it should seek international 
agreement. In doing so, every effort should be made to 
secure a broad, cross-party consensus on the key policy 
goals and the best means of achieving them.
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